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I. INTRODUCTION 
Government authorities at all levels increasingly rely on 
automated predictions, grounded in statistical patterns, to shape 
people’s lives. In this, the government follows a trend pioneered in the 
private sector, and reflected across society: a turn toward quantitative, 
empirical approaches to decision-making. The move is visible in 
everything from the piecemeal targeting of political campaigns; to the 
adaptive learning systems fast spreading through school classrooms; 
to the pricing and marketing of staplers.1  
A daunting thicket of jargon surrounds these trends,2 but no 
matter how one tells the story, digital technology lies at its core. The 
cost of digital sensors, data storage, and processing has been 
plummeting exponentially for more than 50 years,3 while research in 
 
 
 
 
1 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ 
Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534 
[https://perma.cc/B7XQ-Q4KW] (A vibrant if unruly garden of newly-coined terms have 
arisen to point toward these developments, each phrase offering differences of emphasis 
and tone).  
2 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 83-87 (2013) (data at scale, the “quantified 
society,” see Quantified Society: Examining the Consequences of Algorithmic Decision 
Making for Open Societies, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://scholarshipdb.net/jobs-in-United-States/Quantified-Society-Examining-The-
Consequences-Of-Algorithmic-Decision-Making-For-Open-Societies-Open-Society-
Foundations=UJUUA6G_5BGUNAAlkGUTnw.html  [https://perma.cc/2NKJ-33NT], 
among other frames whose core foci overlap and are traceable to digital technology). 
3 See C.A. Mack, Fifty Years of Moore’s Law, 24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SEMICONDUCTOR 
MANUFACTURING 202 (2011).  
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“machine learning” has recently brought rapid advances in computers’ 
capacity to find and act upon patterns in stored data.4 The excitement 
sparked by newly developed applications is also contributing to a 
broad renewal of public and policymaker interest in statistical and 
empirical methods, including in some longstanding techniques.5 
These technologies can do much more than make predictions: They 
recognize and translate speech, diagnose disease, generate art, and do 
much else. But predicting the future—and relying on those predictions 
to change what happens next—is a favorite application of these new 
methods. 
Software that wields government power deserves special attention, 
particularly when it uses historical data to decide automatically what 
ought to happen next. Such software already decides which Medicare 
claims to pay out and which ones to deny as likely fraudulent;6 whose 
tax returns to audit;7 which airport travelers to pluck out of line for 
secondary screening;8 and a myriad of other judgments.9 These are 
characteristically governmental uses of “predictive analytics;” and 
they do, as the organizers of this symposium astutely observe, raise 
“cross-cutting issues.”10  
 
 
 
 
4 These developments are broadly in the field of machine learning, which is itself a subfield 
of artificial intelligence, the general project of getting computers to assume tasks and make 
decisions formerly reserved for humans. See MACHINE LEARNING: THE POWER AND 
PROMISE OF COMPUTERS THAT LEARN BY EXAMPLE, THE ROYAL SOCIETY 18-19 (Apr. 2017) 
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/machine-
learning/publications/machine-learning-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HYH-ZAVP]. 
5 COMPAS, for example, was introduced in 1996. See T. Brennan et al., Evaluating the 
Predictive Validity of the Compas Risk and Needs Assessment System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 21, 21-23 (2008). 
6 See Medicare Fraud Prevention: CMS Has Implemented a Predictive Analytics System, 
but Needs to Define Measures to Determine Its Effectiveness (U.S. Gov't Accountability 
Off., Oct. 2012); Joe Eaton, Glitch in the Machine, PACIFIC STANDARD (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://psmag.com/news/how-to-scam-medicare-in-four-easy-steps 
[https://perma.cc/5KWV-P3Q4]. 
7 Eaton, supra note 7.   
8 Id.  
9 See MICHAEL VEALE, MAX VAN KLEEK & REUBEN BINNS, FAIRNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
DESIGN NEEDS FOR ALGORITHMIC SUPPORT IN HIGH-STAKES PUBLIC SECTOR DECISION-
MAKING 1 (Feb. 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01029 [https://perma.cc/U2K8-B84S].  
10 See Dennis Hirsch, Predictive Analytics Law and Policy: A New Field Emerges, 14 I/S: 
J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 1 (2018). 
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The stakes for governmental use of predictive analytics are 
particularly high in criminal justice, where the public authority being 
applied or shaped by software extends to physical coercion and 
sometimes deadly force.  
In this article, I draw examples primarily from the domain of 
criminal justice—and in particular, the intersection of civil rights and 
criminal justice—to illustrate structural challenges that sweep more 
broadly across governmental uses of predictive analytics; and that 
have some risk of arising whenever law or public policy contemplates 
adopting predictive analytics as a tool. 
These challenges take the form of a gap or disconnect: A difference 
between the circumstances that would be ideal for applying predictive 
analytics, and realities within which the government operates. These 
challenges are likely to arise wherever the government uses predictive 
analytics. Policymakers and the public would do well to take note. 
Section II describes three core tensions in predictive analytics; 
illustrating with examples from the criminal justice domain. Section 
III responds to these challenges by describing feasible ways to 
perform prediction more successfully. Section IV concludes. 
II. THREE CORE TENSIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE PREDICTION 
The literature on predictive analytics in criminal justice repeatedly 
illustrates three core tensions. In the sections that follow, I describe 
and illustrate each of them: 
1) What matters versus what the data measure; 
2) Current goals versus historical patterns; and 
3) Public authority versus private expertise. 
These tensions are likely to arise whenever the government 
embraces statistical prediction (the first two reach even more broadly, 
arising in private and public contexts alike).  
These challenges do not suggest that predictive analytics lack any 
rightful place in government. The key insight is simply that each 
challenge needs to be considered and addressed whenever predictive 
analytics are used to wield government power. 
A. What Matters Versus What the Data Measure 
There is often a gap between what is legally or politically 
significant, and what public sector organizations can or do measure.  
Such disconnects have always been a challenge for large 
organizations that seek to measure and manage their own activities, 
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long predating the current wave of interest in predictive analytics. 
“Campbell’s law,” articulated by the psychologist Donald Campbell in 
1979, observes that “the more any quantitative social indicator is used 
for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption 
pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social 
processes it is intended to monitor.”11 Campbell wrote in the context of 
educational testing in schools; observing that although the tests were 
intended to measure general educational performance, they inevitably 
lost explanatory power—and distorted the school’s activities—once 
teachers recognized the tests’ importance, and adapted by focusing 
pedagogy on improving students’ scores.12 James C. Scott has traced 
this same pattern back centuries earlier, observing that bureaucracies, 
in their need to make their world “legible,” often distort and 
misunderstand local knowledge. 13 He describes such dynamics across 
a myriad of contexts; from the emergence of centralized land tenure in 
Southeast Asia (which replaced and destroyed complex, subtle village-
level practices of land and resource sharing) to the failures of central 
planning in 20th century authoritarian communism.14  
This problem takes on special urgency today in the context of 
data-driven criminal justice. The criminal justice system is a primary 
driver of deprivations of liberty and has lately earned significant, 
sustained critique. Most of its leaders have neither firsthand 
knowledge nor readily available staff expertise in statistics, data 
science, or related fields. Yet the criminal justice system is 
increasingly in thrall to the cultural prestige of “data;” allowing 
optimistic presumptions to replace critical scrutiny. The embrace of 
predictive analytics in criminal justice is, as a result, all too often both 
naïve and consequential. 
The initial choice of what data to measure—and to base 
predictions on—is vitally important because it will shape what later 
counts as an accurate or successful prediction.  
 
 
 
 
11 Donald T. Campbell, Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change, 2 EVALUATION & 
PROGRAM PLAN. 67, 85 (1979). 
12 Id. 
13 See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE 
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). 
14 Id. 
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1. Stops, Citations, and Arrests are Limited Proxies for Police 
Performance 
Police wield extensive, daily power over life and liberty, and they 
are effectively unregulated by many of the constitutional safeguards 
that constrain other applications of governmental power.15 This makes 
it vitally important that they define and measure their performance in 
ways that encourage balanced attention to all the goals of the 
communities they serve; including public order, humane and dignified 
interactions between police and civilians, and a minimization of the 
collateral consequences both of crime and of law enforcement. 
Unfortunately, the things police most often measure – such as 
arrests, citations and stops – are poor proxies for these balanced 
outcomes.  
 “Arrest rates are not, as many seem to believe, measurements of 
crime. Arrest rates are measurements of a particular type of law 
enforcement behavior—arresting suspects.”16   
As one eminent criminologist observed, the criminal justice 
establishment too often ignores these facts: “most of the research on 
the parameters of a criminal career utilizes arrest data to estimate the 
underlying behavioral dynamics of criminal activity. We have fallen 
into bad habits . . . [those arrested] are not a representative sample of 
offenders in the population and findings from arrest samples should 
not be generalized to offenders or offenses in the general 
population.”17 
The extent of the difference between arrest rates and actual crime 
rates is very hard to figure, but one key observation in the criminology 
literature is that some types of arrests are more enforcement-driven, 
and others are relatively more influenced by the actual, true crime 
rate. For example, it is likely that all (or nearly all) bank robberies are 
reported to the police.18 On the other hand, marijuana possession 
 
 
 
 
15 See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION (2017). 
16 David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of 
Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 80 (2003). 
17 DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ARREST STATISTICS, 1-8 (1995). 
18 Carl B. Klockars, Some Really Cheap Ways of Measuring What Really Matters, in 
MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROC. FROM THE POLICE RES. INST. MEETINGS 195, 195-201 
(1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/170610.pdf. [https://perma.cc/BRP3-6Z79] 
(“If I had to select a single type of crime for which its true level—the level at which it is 
reported—and the police statistics that record it were virtually identical, it would be bank 
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arrests are notoriously biased, with black Americans much more likely 
to be arrested than whites who use the drug at similar rates.19 
Yet arrests – and stops and citations, which suffer from similar 
challenges – play a central role in how police define and measure their 
success. New York City’s CompStat, a tool developed inside the New 
York Police Department in 1994, was a pioneering system.20 The 
original CompStat involved computerized analysis and mapping of the 
police department’s own crime statistics, together with weekly 
meetings where police leaders were held accountable based on 
changes in those statistics.21 Most big city police forces now have some 
version of a CompStat-style system.22  
First-generation CompStat-style crime analysis and prediction 
systems—focusing solely on crime numbers generated by the police 
themselves23—have reshaped policing, and there is now a rich 
literature about its impact. A description of the impact in Minneapolis 
is typical: “In the 1990s, it officially established its crime analysis 
program, which has since grown into a large-scale report management 
system and predictive policing effort that is integrated with the 
department’s weekly strategic planning.”24 One of the inventors of 
                                                                                                                   
robbery. Those figures are likely to be identical because banks are geared in all sorts of 
ways. . . to aid in the reporting and recording of robberies and the identification of robbers. 
And, because mostly everyone takes bank robbery seriously, both Federal and local police 
are highly motivated to record such events.”). 
19 ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON 
RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 4 (June 2013) https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-
marijuana-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/NG3Y-P2BX]. 
20 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, COMPSTAT: ITS ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
FUTURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2, 30 (2014) . 
https://www.bja.gov/publications/perf-compstat.pdf [https://perma.cc/L65K-A7ND]. 
21 See id. 
22 In a 2011 survey conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum, 79% of responding 
U.S. police departments indicated they are now using some version of this system. Id. at 
36. 
23 It is important to note that CompStat is an umbrella term for an approach, which 
different departments implement in their own ways. The original CompStat used crime 
data only, and most discussions of the CompStat approach focus on crime statistics. 
Nonetheless, some departments may now be using CompStat in ways that do include other 
data. Id. at 23-36.   
24 WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 74 (2013), 
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“broken windows” policing, writing about the NYPD’s Giuliani-era 
reforms in a generally upbeat essay for a conservative think tank, 
described CompStat as “a new way of managing police resources and 
tactics” and called it “perhaps the single most important 
organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter 
half of the 20th century.”25 
Such systems can distort both the statistics that a department 
collects, and the actual policing activities that are shaped by those 
numbers. The pressure to “produce” arrests amounts to the tail 
wagging the dog. A 2012 study by John Eterno, a criminology scholar 
and former NYPD officer who is one of CompStat’s leading critics, 
surveyed 2,000 retired NYPD officers about the integrity of crime 
statistics and their impact. As summarized by the New York Times, 
the study found that “pressure on officers to artificially reduce crime 
rates, while simultaneously increasing summonses and the number of 
people stopped and often frisked on the street, has intensified in the 
last decade.”26 As Eterno wrote in an op-ed: 
Eighteen years after the start of the much-vaunted 
CompStat system of data-driven crime fighting, the 
Police Department . . . has become a top-down, 
micromanaged bureaucracy in which precinct 
commanders are pitted against one another and 
officers are challenged to match or exceed what they 
did the previous year, month and week. Words like 
“productivity” are code for quotas . . . Reducing crime 
numbers is simple if you disregard basic rights, ignore 
victims, mandate quotas and manipulate numbers. The 
lunacy of this police performance culture can end only 
                                                                                                                   
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND
_RR233.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEM8-K8UN]. 
25 George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact 
of New York City’s Police Reforms, 22 CIVIC REP. 2, 2 (Dec. 2001), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU3P-4LQS] 
(emphasis added). 
26 Wendy Ruderman, New York Police Department Manipulates Crime Reports, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/nyregion/new-
york-police-department-manipulates-crime-reports-study-finds.html. 
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with stronger leadership, greater transparency and 
more meaningful relationships with communities.27 
An expert on police performance management has observed that 
CompStat “picked up and encouraged . . . the focus on disorder 
offenses as a way of reducing fear,” but at the same time the system 
effectively de-emphasized the view that “both the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of police could be increased by reaching out for effective 
working partnerships with community groups, and focusing attention 
on community-nominated problems that might or might not include 
serious crime problems.”28 
Indeed, this disconnect between what is measured and what 
matters appears to plague many police departments that have 
followed New York City’s example. Many of the big cities that use 
CompStat are also committed, at least in principle, to “community 
policing,”29 a goal typically defined in terms of responding directly to 
community priorities in the allocation of police resources. 
Empowering police to address community concerns—partly through 
increased autonomy for precinct commanders—was a big part of the 
rhetoric behind CompStat-style systems.30 But it was crime, not 
community concerns, that got routinely measured, and evidence from 
the field seems to show that in the end, it is the numbers that matter. 
One study of a half-dozen departments that are committed to both 
community policing and CompStat found that: 
CompStat’s contribution to a data-rich environment 
helped sergeants identify emerging crime (but not 
community) problems and focus patrol resources, but it 
 
 
 
 
27 John A. Eterno, Opinion, Policing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/opinion/the-nypds-obsession-with-numbers.html. 
28 MARK HARRISON MOORE ET AL., RECOGNIZING VALUE IN POLICING: THE CHALLENGE OF 
MEASURING POLICE PERFORMANCE 175 (2002). 
29 James J. Willis, First-Line Supervision Under CompStat and Community Policing: 
Lessons From Six Agencies, CTR. FOR JUST. LEADERSHIP AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Mar. 27, 
2011), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p204-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CUQ-
H5CE].   
30 See, e.g., Kelling & Sousa Jr, supra note 26, at 2-8 (“Bratton invested enormous 
authority in precinct commanders, devolving both resources and decision-making to the 
precinct level . . . This administrative mechanism focused the NYPD on substantive 
community problems”). 
160 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
had done little to promote innovative responses to 
those problems. . . Because none of these departments 
had implemented similarly sophisticated data systems 
to support community policing, sergeants did not 
mention receiving information that helped them 
systematically identify community problems, 
determine priorities, and document results. 
Consequently, sergeants tended to learn about those 
issues on a more ad hoc basis.31 
Meanwhile, other dimensions of police performance that are of 
vital interest to the communities they serve too often go unmeasured 
and unaccounted for. The missed opportunities and distortions 
introduced by this disconnect are further described in section 
III(A)(2), below. 
 2. Risk of Re-arrest is a Poor Proxy for Dangerousness 
Across the country judges and court systems are increasingly using 
predictive analytics at bail to predict something that most 
jurisdictions require judges to assess: the risk that the defendant will, 
if released pending trial, fail to appear or be a danger to the 
community.32  
Unfortunately, the outcome variable that these systems typically 
use as a measure of a defendant’s dangerousness is “rearrests within a 
set period of time,” rather than patterns of violence. In other words, 
these tools do not make statistical generalizations about whether 
defendants similar to the one at bar generally tend to commit violent 
crimes during pre-trial release. Instead, most tools fielded today can 
only make generalizations about whether defendants similar to the 
one at bar, who were released before trial, were re-arrested. And most 
re-arrests are for technical, minor infractions; not for new, violent 
crimes. 
The results of this disconnect could be heart-wrenching: 
defendants may be classed as “high risk,” stigmatized as apt to be 
 
 
 
 
31 See Willis, supra note 30, at 3, 11. 
32 For a fuller exploration of the ideas in this section, see John L. Koepke & David G. 
Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, WASH. L. REV. 
(Forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041622 
[https://perma.cc/5ALU-DBN7].  
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violent, and jailed, when in fact they pose a low risk of violence, and 
simply have a high probability of being re-arrested for a technicality. 
B. Current Goals Versus Historical Patterns 
Across a wide range of contexts in criminal justice, the available 
data upon which predictions can be based reflect historical patterns 
that are widely recognized as unjust and undesirable.  
Discussions of predictive tools sometimes assume that the tools 
themselves merely describe and anticipate future patterns. The reality 
is far more challenging: Because the predictions made in criminal 
justice systems are action-guiding, the very act of predicting 
frequently changes what happens in the future. For example, if a 
predictive policing system predicts that a given neighborhood is apt to 
see more crime, and police respond by deploying more patrols in that 
neighborhood, they will be better able to detect crime that happens 
there than they are to detect crime that happens elsewhere; and are 
likely as a result to find and document more crime in that 
neighborhood. 
Bernard Harcourt has termed this issue a “ratchet effect.” He 
describes the problem tidily in his book Against Prediction, writing: 
[W]hen the police profile higher-offending individuals, 
they are effectively sampling more from that higher-
offending group. The resulting set of successful 
searches will contain a disproportionate number of 
those high-offending individuals—disproportionate as 
compared to their representation in the offending 
population. This imbalance will get incrementally 
worse each year if law enforcement departments rely 
on the evidence of last year’s correctional traces—arrest 
or conviction rates—in order to set next year’s profiling 
targets.33 
The ratchet effect is a domain-specific example of the problem of 
“hidden feedback loops,” which bedevils modern applications of 
 
 
 
 
33 Bernard E. Harcourt, A reader's companion to 'Against Protection’ 265, 271 (U. of Chi. 
Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 175, 2007), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=public_
law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/H7PX-J79M]. 
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predictive analytics generally,34 and which is recognized across many 
applications of machine learning and other predictive statistical 
techniques.  
 1. Predictive Policing and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
PredPol is a leading vendor of predictive analytics software for 
police. Its system forecasts where and when various types of crime 
may happen, relying on police-held administrative data about the 
time, location and type of previously reported crimes.35 The company 
claims that, because its system “uses no personal information about 
individuals or groups of individuals,” the tool does not raise “any 
personal liberties and profiling concerns.”36 A mathematician and an 
anthropologist, who were involved in starting the company, have also 
published a peer-reviewed study that details the mathematics behind 
the company’s approach and reports a field trial in which software 
using this approach outperformed human crime analysts.37 
Recently, two statisticians from the Human Rights Data Analysis 
Group (HRDAG) used PredPol’s approach as a case in point, to 
investigate what might happen if police were to rely on predictive 
 
 
 
 
34 D. SCULLEY ET AL., MACHINE LEARNING: THE HIGH-INTEREST CREDIT CARD OF TECHNICAL 
DEBT 1, 3 (2014) 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/4314
6.pdf [https://perma.cc/86EB-3XRP] (the authors use a hypothetical example of a 
predictive system designed to maximize the click-through rate on news headlines – rather 
than a predictive policing system – to illustrate the same troubling dynamic: 
Imagine in our news headline [click through rate] prediction system that there is 
another component of the system in charge of “intelligently” determining the size 
of the font used for the headline. If this font-size module [uses the click-through 
rate] as an input signal, and font-size has an effect on user propensity to click, then 
the inclusion of CTR in font-size adds a new hidden feedback loop. It’s easy to 
imagine a case where such a system would gradually and endlessly increase the size 
of all headlines). 
35 About Us, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/N8LW-NVBD]. 
(“PredPol uses only three data points in making predictions: past type of crime, place of 
crime and time of crime”). 
36 Id. 
37 G.O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 110 J. AM. 
STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015). 
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analytics in targeting their response to drug crimes.38 HRDAG is an 
NGO staffed by data scientists, which has spent the last 25 years 
applying statistical expertise to document the extent of genocides 
overseas. More recently, the group has turned its attention to law and 
order in the United States, with a growing focus on policing.39 
The HRDAG analysis compared the locations and times of drug-
related arrests in Oakland, California (obtained from the Oakland 
police) with estimates of the actual level of drug use in the city, which 
they extrapolated from the 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health, a study commissioned by the federal Department of Health 
and Human Services.40 They found that: 
drug arrests in the police database appear concentrated 
in . . . two areas with largely non- white and low-
income populations. These neighbourhoods experience 
about 200 times more drug-related arrests than areas 
outside of these clusters. In contrast, our estimates 
[based on the federal drug use survey] suggest that 
drug crimes are much more evenly distributed across 
the city. This suggests that while drug crimes exist 
everywhere, drug arrests tend to only occur in very 
specific locations – the police data appear to 
disproportionately represent crimes committed in 
 
 
 
 
38 Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016, at 14-19 
(2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2016.00960.x/epdf 
[https://perma.cc/A25A-SE5M]. 
39 Patrick Ball, Violence in Blue, GRANTA MAG. (Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://granta.com/violence-in-blue/ [https://perma.cc/XWV9-Y7LR] (applying list-
dependent estimation techniques across several datasets to estimate the number of people 
killed by police in the U.S.). The Bureau of Justice Statistics commissioned a report that 
used the same approach to estimate the “arrested-related deaths that are the result of law 
enforcement homicides,” D. BANKS ET AL., RTI INT'L, ARREST-RELATED DEATHS PROGRAM 
ASSESSMENT: TECHNICAL REPORT 2 (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ardpatr.pdf [https://perma.cc/25BQ-EY7H]. Both 
the HRDAG and BJS-commissioned analyses found that the number of such deaths 
captured by official statistics is likely significantly fewer than the true number. 
40 Population Data/National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/population-data-nsduh [https://perma.cc/3VMK-ST2H] 
(stating, “[t]he National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) is the primary source of 
information on the prevalence, patterns, and consequences of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal 
drug use and abuse and mental disorders in the U.S. civilian, non-institutionalized 
population, age 12 and older.”). 
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areas with higher populations of non-white and low-
income residents.41 
In the end, the authors find that “rather than correcting for the 
apparent biases in the police data, the model reinforces these biases. 
The locations that are flagged for targeted policing are those that were, 
by our estimates, already over-represented in the historical police 
data.”42 
 2. Reasonable Suspicion Meets Automation Bias 
Legal scholars who consider predictive analytics in the context of 
criminal justice have focused extensively on the Fourth Amendment 
risks of predictive policing.43 Those risks are real and significant, 
particularly in heavily policed, heavily surveilled communities.  
The primary challenge arises in the context of Terry stops—where 
the police lack probable cause to arrest a person, but do, nonetheless, 
detain the person on “reasonable suspicion” of involvement in 
criminal activity.44 The Supreme Court has held that a person’s mere 
presence in a “high-crime area” suffices as one factor out of the 
requisite minimum of two factors to create constitutionally reasonable 
suspicion for a stop.45 However, the Court has never defined what 
 
 
 
 
41 Lum & Isaac, supra note 38. 
42 Id. at 18. 
43 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 783 (2012) 
(“[S]cholars take their subject to be Supreme Court cases involving the Constitution rather 
than the problem of policing . . . They argue that a police activity falls within or outside the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment” (citations omitted)). See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing 
by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Andrew 
Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259 
(2012); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Predictive Policing” and the Fourth Amendment, AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-
online/predictive-policing-and-fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/9MW8-67ZJ]; 
Alexander H. Kipperman, Frisky Business: Mitigating Predictive Crime Software’s 
Facilitation of Unlawful Stop and Frisks, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 215 (2014); 
Kelly K. Koss, Leveraging Predictive Policing Algorithms to Restore Fourth Amendment 
Protections in High-Crime Areas in a Post-Wardlow World, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 
(2015). 
44 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
45 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). The case also held that unprovoked flight from 
police taking place in a “high-crime area” can count as the second such factor. Id.  
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counts as a “high-crime area,” and in practice police apparently have 
wide latitude to claim that the area where they made a given stop was 
“high-crime” without having to substantiate that assertion.46 For 
people in an area that courts are prepared to consider high-crime, 
there may thus be just one further factor needed to justify a stop. 
Andrew Ferguson, a leading scholar of the Fourth Amendment 
issues posed by predictive policing and other new technologies, has 
written: “A police stop based on a predictive policing forecast soon will 
be in front of a trial court in a motion to suppress evidence.”47 At that 
time, “the judge or arresting officer will have no way to test the 
accuracy” of the correlation that the prediction is based upon, before 
deciding whether to act on it in a particular case.48 
Regardless of how accurate or inaccurate a predictive policing 
system may be, officers may well give credence to any indication of 
concern or suspicion that comes from a computer—and courts are 
likely to agree that such flags do constitute reasonable suspicion, 
particularly in high-crime areas where no other factors are needed.  
3. “Well-Calibrated” Bail Predictions Put a Disparate Burden on 
Black Defendants 
A recent journalistic investigation of predictive analytics in the 
courtroom provides a vivid illustration of the gap between legal 
ambiguity and technological precision. A team of journalists at 
ProPublica investigated the proprietary COMPAS risk assessment 
algorithm, which is used to evaluate the reappearance risk and 
 
 
 
 
46 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable 
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590–91 (2008), 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=aulr 
[https://perma.cc/RGG8-MA5M] (“The Supreme Court has never provided a definition. 
Lower court decisions are equally imprecise. Yet, as practicing criminal defense lawyers 
know, the question is highlighted in almost every Fourth Amendment suppression hearing 
focused on the legitimacy of a police stop. A police officer takes the stand, explains his 
actions, testifies to his suspicions, adds the magic words—’high-crime area’—and 
reasonable suspicion is found as a matter of constitutional law. Rarely is there any analysis 
of why this particular area is a high-crime area, on what objective, verifiable, or empirical 
data the police officer has based his conclusion, or whether the officer knew this 
information before he made the stop.” (citations omitted)).  
47 Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 43, at 312. 
48 ANDREW FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 127 (2017). 
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dangerousness of pretrial detainees at bail hearings in Broward 
County, Florida.49 Using Florida’s freedom of information law with 
painstaking diligence, the journalists “looked at more than 10,000 
criminal defendants in Broward County, Florida, and compared their 
predicted recidivism rates with the rate that actually occurred over a 
two-year period.”50 
The report’s headline described COMPAS as “biased against 
blacks.” Although the system made mistakes roughly equally often in 
predicting the recidivism of white and of black defendants, the burden 
of wrongly being labelled “high risk” was borne disproportionately by 
blacks. That is, among those defendants who in fact did not go on to 
reoffend, the black defendants were far more likely than the white 
ones to have been labelled “high risk.” On the other hand, the system’s 
mistaken predictions about white defendants trended the other way: 
the system was far more likely to classify as low risk a white defendant 
who went on to be rearrested, than to classify as low risk a black 
defendant who went on to be rearrested. On this basis, the journalists 
described the system as biased against blacks. Northpointe defended 
itself by saying that its algorithm was “well calibrated” across races, 
that is, had the same probability of being correct, regardless of 
whether the defendant was white or black.51 
A wave of scholarship, triggered by the ProPublica report, 
illuminated the statistical challenge at the heart of the argument: 
Given that the underlying “base rate” of re-arrest is higher for blacks 
than for whites, it is mathematically inevitable that the burden of false 
positives will fall more heavily on black defendants than on white 
ones. In other words, given that more black defendants than white 
defendants actually do have a high risk of being rearrested, a “high 
risk” label that is correct 70% of the time for both white and black 
defendants will still mislabel more black than white defendants as 
high risk. A study titled “Inherent Tradeoffs in the Fair Determination 
of Risk Scores” proved mathematically that when re-arrest rates are 
not equal between races, a well-calibrated tool like Northpointe’s – 
 
 
 
 
49 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/2K23-LP6X].  
50 Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-
recidivism-algorithm [https://perma.cc/JD95-ZT87]. 
51 Id.  
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that is, a tool that is mistaken equally often about whites and about 
blacks – will inevitably have more false positives for blacks.52 As the 
authors of a second study explained, to equalize the error rates, one 
would have to make the tool itself race-conscious, and set “multiple, 
race-specific [risk of re-arrest] thresholds.”53 
In short, an intuitive understanding of equal protection cannot 
square with the mathematics of predictive risk scoring. Under real 
conditions, a tool that is equally often mistaken about white and black 
defendants will more often send blacks to jail by mistake than send 
whites to jail by mistake. But an explicitly race-conscious risk 
assessment tool, that predicted scores differently for whites than for 
blacks, would itself face serious constitutional challenges. An 
understanding of “equal protection” that would require race-
blindness, and simultaneously require that races are burdened equally 
by prediction errors, simply does not leave room for risk assessment 
tools to operate.  
C. Public Authority Versus Private Expertise 
The criminal justice system, like other parts of government, often 
lacks technological expertise, leaving commercial vendors in a 
privileged position.54 Vendors can, and often do, shape officials’ 
understanding not only of how technologies work, but also of how the 
tools’ performance should be understood and assessed. Not 
surprisingly, vendors often practice technical “shock and awe,” 
encouraging strong optimism about what their systems can do and 
simultaneously discouraging pointed questions about how those 
systems work. 
 
 
 
 
52 JON KLEINBERG ET AL., INHERENT TRADE-OFFS IN THE FAIR DETERMINATION OF RISK 
SCORES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf [https://perma.cc/J29A-
LPMK].  
53 SAM CORBETT-DAVIES ET AL., ALGORITHMIC DECISION MAKING AND THE COST OF FAIRNESS 
(June 10, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.08230.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZKW-H7DY]. 
See also GEOFF PLEISS ET AL., ON FAIRNESS AND CALIBRATION (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02012.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3HV-JS64] (“[I]nvestigat[ing] 
the tension between minimizing error disparity across different population groups while 
maintaining calibrated probability estimates.”).   
54 See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology 
Companies on Policing, N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE (Sept. 2017), 
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/Joh-FINAL_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XPP2-RC6F].  
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 1. The Cautionary Tale of Beware 
In 2015, police in Fresno, California tested a software system 
evocatively named “Beware.” Beware integrates with the dispatch 
screens shown to 911 operators, and assigns a “threat score” to 
community members who initiate 911 calls—that is, to the people who 
call for help, rather than those who are suspected of wrongdoing.55 
Although purchases of predictive policing systems often go unnoticed 
by the public,56 in this case a community group called Faith in the 
Valley knew about, and provided input into, the police department’s 
decision-making process.57 When community members’ concerns 
were not well addressed by the department, they brought their 
concerns to the city council, triggering national press attention.58 
If predictive policing systems are trying to predict—or are treated 
as though they were trying to predict—the risk that officers will face 
violence when responding to a call, the results could be deadly. Yet 
Beware is likely to create confusion on precisely this point. 
The physical risks associated with being a police officer are at or 
near all-time lows,59 even after accounting for the events of the last 
 
 
 
 
55 David Robinson, Buyer Beware: A Hard Look at Police ‘Threat Scores’, EQUAL FUTURE 
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://medium.com/equal-future/buyer-beware-a-hard-look-at-police-
threat-scores-961f73b88b10#.6ym7bx9x7 [https://perma.cc/B62H-TBR3]. Portions of the 
below discussion of Beware were first published in this earlier short article. 
56 David Robinson & Logan Koepke, Stuck in a Pattern, UPTURN 10 (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.teamupturn.org/reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern [https://perma.cc/JV55-
QLKJ] (observing that, based on a survey of publicly available information about predictive 
policing at the nation’s 50 largest police departments, “an open public debate regarding a 
police department’s potential adoption of a predictive policing system seems to be the 
exception to the rule.”). 
57 See Taymah Jahsi, It’s Time to Shine a Light on Police Surveillance in Fresno, ACLU OF 
N. CAL. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/its-time-shine-light-police-
surveillance-fresno [https://perma.cc/L4HF-9PNA].  
58 Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are You: Calculating Your Threat ‘Score’, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-
police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-
baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html?tid=pm_pop_b [https://perma.cc/P3FR-FYYM].   
59 Radley Balko, Once Again: There is No ‘War on Cops’, WASH. POST: THE WATCH (Sept. 
10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/09/10/once-
again-there-is-no-war-on-cops-and-those-who-claim-otherwise-are-playing-a-dangerous-
game/ [https://perma.cc/42SE-GSBP].  
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several years.60 Nonetheless, public discussion of a “war on cops” or a 
“Ferguson effect” creates the false impression of a problem out of 
control.61 Beware leverages this anxiety, arguing for example in one of 
its brochures that “there are no routine calls.”62  
A system that improved officer insight into which situations were 
high risk – and was deployed in a way that led to more cautious, 
deliberate responses – might indeed make people safer. But there is 
no way to be confident that Beware works this way—and ample reason 
to fear that the system could actually aggravate risks to innocent life.  
Responsible voices in the policing community have long been 
concerned about the low legal standards that attach to officers’ use of 
force, including deadly force. As former Madison, Wisconsin police 
chief David Couper writes, ever since the Supreme Court case of 
Graham v. Connor,63 an officer can “legally use deadly force based on 
whether the officer reasonably believed his or her life was in danger 
. . . Before this decision, officers were expected to use only the 
minimum amount of force necessary to overcome resistance.”64 This 
gives officers extremely wide latitude: “Add to this decision the fear 
every police officer has that he or she could be disarmed and shot you 
have a ‘perfect storm’ of police using deadly force in almost any 
situation involving resistance.”65 
Predictive policing that tries to predict risks to officers could make 
this problem worse. As The Atlantic noted in its coverage of the 
Beware system, it could create “troublingly perverse incentives, 
 
 
 
 
60 Radley Balko, In the End, 2015 Saw No ‘War on Cops’ and No ‘National Crime Wave’, 
WASH. POST: THE WATCH (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2015/12/22/in-the-end-2015-saw-no-war-on-cops-and-no-national-crime-
wave/ [https://perma.cc/H6VB-8S3P].  
61 Samuel Sinyangwe, Stop Pretending the “Ferguson Effect” is Real, MEDIUM (Oct. 27, 
2015), https://medium.com/@samswey/stop-pretending-the-ferguson-effect-is-real-
40e3684fae3d#.3z1a4rz4b [https://perma.cc/HE23-YLQS].  
62 INTRADO, BEWARE INCIDENT INTELLIGENCE 13 (2015), 
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/201512-
social_media_monitoring_softare_pra_response.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NUF-YVX8].  
63 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
64 David C. Couper, Police Use of Deadly Force: Time for Discussion, IMPROVING POLICE 
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://improvingpolice.wordpress.com/2015/03/18/police-use-of-
deadly-force-time-for-discussion/ [https://perma.cc/DC3V-YJGW].  
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insofar as cops who use deadly force are judged based on what a 
reasonable officer would’ve done in the same situation with the same 
information . . . Will the fact that police were responding to a call 
relating to a house or individual with a red threat level now be used to 
argue that subsequent force was relatively more reasonable?”66 
The company selling Beware (Intrado, a unit of West Corp.) has 
disclosed little to the public about how its product works. In fact, even 
the police departments that rely on this product have limited insight 
into its workings. The system remains unproven by neutral evidence 
and is marketed in a way that could easily make officers think it 
predicts risks to their lives.67 
By piecing together public information—including marketing 
materials and internal police documents related to a trial deployment 
in Fresno68 which the ACLU obtained via public records request;69 job 
descriptions and employee reviews,70 securities filings and other 
sources—it is possible to build a composite picture of the system’s 
operation. And that picture is concerning. 
A basic question – perhaps the most basic question – about any 
application of predictive analytics is what, exactly, the system aims to 
predict. In other words, here, what do Beware’s “threat scores” 
actually describe? What would it mean to say that the scores are, or 
are not, accurate? 
The public record leaves even this basic question unanswered. 
Here are three possibilities – listed in order from least to most 
feasible, which also happens to be from most to least useful: 
(1) Predicting the risk to officers during their response to a call.  
 
 
 
 
66 Conor Friedersdorf, A Police Department’s Secret Formula for Judging Danger, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/a-police-
departments-secret-formula-for-judging-danger/423642/ [https://perma.cc/VJ6M-
YVN5].  
67 See INTRADO, supra note 62. 
68 Id. 
69 Letter from Matthew T. Cagle, Technology & Civil Liberties Policy Attorney & Matthew 
W. Callahan, Technology & Civil Liberties Fellow, to Jerry Dyer, Police Chief, Fresno Police 
Dept., Re: Public Records Act Request Regarding Social Media Monitoring Software (Sept. 
16, 2015), https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20150916-fresno_social_media_pra.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6M94-KTFX].  
70 See, e.g., Anonymous Emp. in Longmont, CO, West Safety Services: “Software 
Engineer”, GLASSDOOR (Dec. 6, 2015) https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/Employee-
Review-West-Safety-Services-RVW8839318.htm [https://perma.cc/6RHV-82FZ]. 
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Beware’s marketing emphasizes risks to officer safety. For 
example, a company brochure argues that ambushes or surprise 
attacks, staged by people previously arrested for violent crimes, 
account for a large fraction of officer fatalities.71 Did Intrado, or 
anyone else, assemble the “commercial records” and “website hits” of 
people who actually have assaulted police officers, finding enough 
such people to be able to predict, in a statistically responsible way, 
which out of thousands of consumer purchases or web site visits make 
a person more likely to assault an officer? Probably not: In 2014, 
Fresno police answered 408,718 calls for service, and there were, 
remarkably, a grand total of only 363 assaults on the city’s officers. 
Even if those 363 assailants shared certain traits — perhaps they were 
more likely to use Twitter, or to buy Cornflakes, than other Fresno 
residents — such trends are more likely to be spurious correlations 
than a meaningful statistical signal. Perhaps Beware uses national 
statistics on assaults or violent acts, which would offer a much larger 
sample size from which to draw conclusions. That, however, would 
also discount any variation across different localities. 
(2) Predicting violence against anyone while officers are on the 
scene — not just against the officers themselves.  
Even then, the numbers are vanishingly small: There were fewer 
than 3,000 “crimes against persons” in Fresno all year, and in many of 
those cases, police were dispatched because the crime had already 
occurred, rather than because it was imminent. 
(3) Predicting violence against anyone by a person near the call, 
whether during or after the officer’s response.  
Out of the three predictive possibilities outlined here, this scenario 
is the most plausible one to imagine aiming at, because there’s a much 
larger sample size of people who’ve been arrested for violent crimes. 
However, this is also the least useful kind of prediction for the officer 
or dispatcher since it’s least focused on the actual situation that they 
are dealing with. 
When the Fresno police briefed the city council about the Beware 
system, the council president asked a simple question about those 
color-coded threat levels: “How does a person get to red?” His police 
force, it turns out, doesn’t know, because the vendor won’t tell them. 
As Elizabeth Joh has written, “The relationships between surveillance 
technology vendors and police departments show the increasing 
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degree to which private companies can guide, shape, and limit what 
the public police do.”72 
As the officer delivering the briefing explained: “We don’t know 
what their algorithm is exactly… We don’t have any kind of a list that 
will tell us, this is their criteria, this is what would make a person red, 
this is what would make a person yellow. It’s their own system.”73 
Later in that meeting, one of the council members asked the officers to 
run a live threat assessment on the council member’s own home. It 
came back yellow, apparently indicating a medium threat in that 
home (though the council member himself came back green). 
In the end, Fresno’s city council refused the police department’s 
request for funding to use the Beware system beyond its initial trial 
period.74  
 2. The Opacity of Evidence Based Sentencing: The Loomis Case 
There is a rich debate in the criminal justice literature about what 
role, if any, a defendant’s potential commission of future crimes 
should play in shaping his sentence.75 Much of this debate is traceable 
 
 
 
 
72 Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on 
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 102 (2017). 
73 Robinson, Buyer Beware, supra note 55. 
74 Tim Sheehan, Fresno Council Halts Purchase of Data Software Wanted by Police, 
FRESNOBEE (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article69337677.html 
[https://perma.cc/DM2G-5YU5].  
75 See generally John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal 
Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489 (2016); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 
(2014) [hereinafter Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination]; Richard G. Kopf, Federal Supervised Release and Actuarial Data 
(Including Age, Race, and Gender): The Camel’s Nose and the Use of Actuarial Data at 
Sentencing, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 207 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, The New Profiling: Why 
Punishing Based on Poverty and Identity Is Unconstitutional and Wrong, 27 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 229 (2015); Mark H. Bergstrom & Joseph Sabino Mistick, Danger and Opportunity: 
Making Public Safety Job One in Pennsylvania’s Indeterminate Sentencing System, 12 
JUST. RES. & POL’Y 73 (2010); Claire Botnick, Evidence-Based Practice and Sentencing in 
State Courts: A Critique of the Missouri System, 49 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 159 (2015); 
PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A NATIONAL 
WORKING GROUP (2011), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/csi/rna%20guide%20final.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/ZK2Z-KTRC]. 
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to fundamental and unresolved disagreements about the purposes of 
criminal sentencing. Contending visions include the retributivist ideal, 
wherein a defendant’s sentence reflects and is controlled by the 
conduct of which he has been convicted; a rehabilitative model that 
aims to return the convict to society whole; and utilitarian approaches 
that define the optimal sentence in terms of its impact upon future 
conduct by the defendant (incapacitation and “specific” deterrence) or 
by others (“general” deterrence). Some scholars have aimed to 
combine these approaches,76 and the federal sentencing statute 
ultimately embraces all of them in its list of objectives for the Federal 
Sentencing Commission.77  
There is a growing move toward incorporating statistical 
predictions of recidivism at sentencing. Professor Sonja Starr—who in 
2014 found at least twenty states moving to implement statistical 
prediction at sentencing—has written the leading critique of this 
approach. She finds a number of practical problems. To wit, risk-
based sentencing instruments “provide wildly imprecise individual 
risk predictions, that there is no compelling evidence that they 
outperform judges' informal predictions, that less discriminatory 
alternatives would likely perform as well, and that the instruments do 
not even address the right question: the effect of a given sentencing 
decision on recidivism risk.”78  
In short, evidence-based sentencing is widely adopted but its 
statistical mechanisms—and the limits of those mechanisms—are 
poorly understood by judges and courts.  
Wisconsin’s sentencing regime provides a stark example. As 
described in Section II(B)(1) above, COMPAS is a proprietary, 
commercially marketed risk assessment system that was designed to 
assist judges, before trial, in predicting defendants’ likelihood of 
skipping bail or getting rearrested before their cases are resolved. The 
 
 
 
 
76 See generally Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical 
Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393 (1985). 
77 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (listing “the need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant 
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.”). 
78 Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 
supra note 75, at 803.  
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tool was the target of a journalistic investigation suggesting that it 
exhibited racial bias. The team of investigative journalists at 
ProPublica who constructed that analysis were not privy to the code 
by which COMPAS operates.79In Wisconsin, despite the fact that 
COMPAS was designed as a pretrial tool, the state now applies the 
tool at the sentencing phase, to predict the likelihood of re-offense 
after release from a prison sentence (something that the tool was 
never designed to measure, and that its training data – about pre-trial 
outcomes – does not address.) In the case of State v. Loomis,80 the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered an appeal from Eric Loomis. 
At Loomis’s trial, the presiding judge had cited Loomis’s COMPAS 
score as one factor among many in justifying his sentence. On appeal, 
the state Supreme Court considered whether the “proprietary nature 
of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the COMPAS 
assessment's scientific validity,” in violation of defendants’ due 
process rights.81 
The state’s Supreme Court, much like stakeholders elsewhere in 
the criminal justice system, was hard-pressed to understand or 
evaluate the workings of the COMPAS instrument. As one Justice 
wrote in her concurrence, “this court's lack of understanding of 
COMPAS was a significant problem in the instant case. At oral 
argument, the court repeatedly questioned both the State's and 
defendant's counsel about how COMPAS works. Few answers were 
available.”82 
In the end, the court in Loomis did not provide crisp guidance on 
the constitutionality of COMPAS at sentencing. Instead, in its own 
words, the court “ultimately conclude[d] that a COMPAS risk 
assessment can be used at sentencing, [but only] by circumscribing its 
use[.]”83 The court mandated that sentencing judges be provided with 
a written list of five cautions, which it spelled out in bullet form—
including that COMPAS is proprietary and its inner workings 
undisclosed, that “some studies . . . have raised questions” about 
whether the tool is racially biased, and that the tool “was not 
 
 
 
 
79 Angwin et al., supra note 40. 
80 State v. Loomis, 2016 WI App 68, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749. 
81 Id. at ¶ 6. 
82 Id. at ¶ 133. 
83 Id. at ¶ 35. 
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developed for use at sentencing.”84 “[T]his advisement,” the court 
went on to say, “should be regularly updated as other cautions become 
more or less relevant as additional data becomes available,”85 though 
the court did not specify who would be responsible for such updating 
or what process they might use. Moreover, the court warned, “a 
COMPAS risk assessment may not be determinative in deciding 
whether a defendant may be supervised safely and effectively in the 
community.”86 
Court and police access to data-related expertise is a challenge that 
spans well beyond predictive analytics. The justice system also 
struggles, for example, to understand the value and limits of forensic 
tools such as software that deciphers DNA mixtures.87 Trade secrecy—
originally a commercial doctrine—has now spread into the criminal 
justice domain, where it works to inhibit courts and defense counsel 
from scrutinizing software code that underpins convictions.88 
III. DOING PREDICTION RIGHT 
Each of the gaps described above requires collaborative effort to 
bridge. Experts across fields need to work more closely together. 
Everyone is at the periphery of their competence, in one way or 
another, in facing these challenges. There are a handful of steps that 
are natural starting points in nearly any application of predictive 
analytics. 
A. Find or Create Data About What Really Matters 
The most important design choice that shapes any predictive 
analytic system is the choice of input data. By choosing (or creating) 
 
 
 
 
84 Id. at ¶ 100. 
85 Id. at ¶ 101. 
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87 See Logan Koepke, Should secret code help convict?, EQUAL FUTURE (Mar. 24, 2016), 
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input data that aligns with true public policy goals, we can improve 
our chances of achieving those goals.  
Government’s capacity to monitor and understand its subjects—
and its employees—is rapidly growing. Much has been written about 
the increasingly panoptic vantage point from which government 
power is exercised; a vantage point informed by pervasive government 
surveillance and by government access to a far more extensive 
infrastructure of corporate, commercial surveillance. However, as 
troubling as this trend may be, it also offers a silver lining: the world is 
suffused with new data, and newly cheap and easy ways to generate 
further data, that tell on questions that matter in public life. 
1. Measuring Violence Beyond the Police: Victimization Surveys, 
Health Data, and the Example of the Cardiff Model 
Police statistics leave much to be desired as measures of criminal 
activity and of police violence, as described above in Section II(A). 
Such data are inevitably biased, in the statistical sense, toward greater 
awareness of the areas where officers concentrate their patrols. 
Officers face incentives to “downcode” some crime reports in order to 
create a favorable portrait of the department’s performance, and a 
great deal of crime may go unreported. 
One vital way to supplement police data is to ask people in the 
community about their experiences as victims of crime. Victimization 
is just one of the areas in which useful data could be generated by a 
systematic, ongoing survey capacity that allows for documentation of 
community experiences of safety, as described in subsection 2, infra. 
The information gains from such a strategy could be significant: The 
Department of Justice conducts a National Crime Victimization 
Survey, which found that from 2006-2010 (the most recent data now 
available), 52 percent of violent crime victimizations89 went 
unreported to police and 60 percent of household property crime 
victimizations went unreported.90 Historically, the National Crime 
 
 
 
 
89 “Crime victimization,” according to the Department of Justice, includes violent 
victimization (rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault) and 
property victimization (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and property theft) as well as 
domestic violence and intimate partner violence. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2014 
(2015), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5366 [https://perma.cc/X95Z-
6LMU]. 
90 LYNN LANGTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL 
REPORT: VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006-2010, 2 (2012). 
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Victimization Survey has shown that police are not notified of about 
half of all rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults.91 More local and 
more frequent victimization surveys could give local communities an 
ongoing map of safety and other concerns.92 
A second potentially vital source of data about community 
violence rests with the second major bureaucracy that responds to 
violent incidents: the health system. A pioneering effort of this type 
began in the Welsh city of Cardiff and is now known as the Cardiff 
Model; it has been extensively studied and is now being piloted in the 
United States.93  
In the Cardiff Model, a multi-stakeholder Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnership is established, and the emergency medical 
services contribute to that body by “sharing, electronically wherever 
possible, simple anonymized data about precise location of violence, 
weapon use, assailants and day/time of violence.”94 Such data includes 
information about incidents that may not have been reported to the 
police, and naturally includes information about where and when the 
injury took place, which can help police in their investigations.95 
Moreover, emergency rooms “are the only sources of information 
about serial (repeat) injury: a recognized precursor to homicide in the 
home and elsewhere.”96 
This approach is not a silver bullet. No data source is perfect, and 
the animating goals of medical treatment are different than those of 
community safety, which will have some impact on the nature and 
completeness of the data collected. For example, although the time 
elapsed since a violent injury may be vitally important for the 
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92 See Mark H. Moore & Margaret Poethig, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, The 
Police as an Agency of Municipal Government: Implications for Measuring Police 
Effectiveness, in MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROC. FROM THE POLICE RES. INST. MEETINGS 
164 (1999). 
93 See Piloting the Cardiff Model for Violence Prevention in the United States to provide 
better local information to address violence problems, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., 
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treatment of a newly admitted patient, the precise location where the 
injury took place is not of comparable importance to the medical aims 
of a hospital, and as a result, may be recorded with less care if at all. A 
description of barriers to the Cardiff model, published by the model’s 
primary advocate, observes that some medical staff believe it is unduly 
paternalistic to take an interest in circumstances beyond the patient’s 
immediate medical needs, and also that police sometimes 
unreasonably demand evidentiary documentation from hospitals that 
would be typical of police work but is atypical for a hospital.97 
A 2011 study in the British Medical Journal, which looked at the 
impact of the Cardiff Model over a four year period, found that 
“[i]nformation sharing and use were associated with a substantial and 
significant reduction in hospital admissions related to violence.”98 
Moreover, the model had “led to a significant reduction in violent 
injury and was associated with an increase in police recording of 
minor assaults in Cardiff compared with similar cities in England and 
Wales where this intervention was not implemented.”99 
Although work on the Cardiff Model has focused on emergency 
room treatment data, there is also some early work suggesting that 
ambulance dispatch records may have significant value as well.100  
In the United States, in addition to efforts expressly patterned on 
the Cardiff model (including one funded by the CDC101), there are also 
a number of other early efforts to use health data as indicia of 
community violence. For example, Hospital Violence Intervention 
Programs (HVIPs) use interviews with hospital patients to target 
social services. One effort attempted to track shootings specifically by 
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police through health data.102 And an emerging area of research uses 
health data to forecast child abuse and target child protective 
efforts.103 
 2. Police Performance: The New Wealth of Alternate Measures 
In most of the nation, we currently measure outcomes and assess 
performance based on only a subset of the behaviors, costs, and 
benefits that matter in policing. If predictive policing systems extend 
this mistake into the big data era, they may well make policing worse. 
If, however, these new systems expand and enrich the ways that we 
measure and understand police performance, they may well be a 
major benefit to civil rights. 
“As our ideas of policing have changed . . . we find that we need 
information that we do not now have. To the extent that we are 
interested in preventing crimes through means other than arrests, we 
have to find ways to recognize such activities, and to evaluate their 
impact.”104 Serious violent crimes may always “remain important, but 
community concerns frequently center on other issues. Many crimes 
are not reported, and therefore police would need to use a broader 
range of data sources—including public health information and 
victimization surveys—even to be able to see the full range of 
problems that matter.”105 
As Professor Rachel Harmon has argued, in terms of the cost-
benefit analysis by which so many public programs are evaluated, our 
current approach overlooks the “coercion costs” of policing.106 This is 
a profound asymmetry: “In cost-benefit assessments of programs that 
 
 
 
 
102 Joseph B. Richardson et al., Who Shot Ya? How Emergency Departments Can Collect 
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103 See Dyann Daley et al., Risk Terrain Modeling Predicts Child Maltreatment, 62 CHILD 
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influence local policing, they reason expansively with respect to 
benefits, recognizing a multitude of costs averted by federal programs 
when the programs prevent crime, such as the pain and suffering 
avoided when a federally funded officer prevents an offense. But they 
consider only the budgetary outlay to the federal agency as costs. They 
do not contemplate any harm—and, therefore, any cost— from 
policing itself.”107 Such logic applies broadly, not only to the go/no-go 
decisions made about particular programs and investments, but also 
to the more specific and tactical choices made by police in the course 
of their daily activities. 
An ideal measurement and prediction system would track, 
highlight, and reward excellence, not just compliance. “It is possible to 
both remedy shortcomings and thwart the natural tendencies toward 
defensive responses by viewing the problem not as one of detecting 
deficiency but of creating measures of good service.”108 
One key element of this approach might be police investment in “a 
large, continuing capacity to survey citizens.”109 New technologies 
make survey methods easier and more cost effective to implement 
than ever before, including via SMS and other widely deployed 
technologies.110 Similarly, “a sample of individuals who call the police 
(or ask officers on the streets or in station houses) for assistance” 
should be asked about the service they receive.111 And those who are 
stopped or arrested – a group that might be called “obligates” – could 
usefully be asked about their experience as one source of data about 
how police conduct themselves in exercising their powers.112 
New yardsticks that could be constructive to use include: 
1. Surveyed levels of crime victimization, community trust, and 
police legitimacy: The public should be asked about its view of the 
police, its experience of criminal victimization, and its fears and 
priorities. Surveys could “develop a more accurate picture than we 
now have about the real level of criminal victimization . . . measure 
 
 
 
 
107 Id. at 873. 
108 Klockars, supra note 18, at 202. 
109 MOORE & POETHIG, supra note 92, at 164. 
110 See Koepke & Robinson, Danger Ahead, supra note 32. 
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levels of fear as well as victimization . . . measure citizen satisfaction 
with the quality of police service, and . . . discover the level and type of 
self-defense that is being used to complement police efforts.”113 
2. Outreach efforts and proactive problem solving: Malcolm 
Sparrow, an expert on police performance measurement, calls for 
written accounts of problems that the department has proactively 
addressed. “Each project account will describe how the department 
spotted the problem in the first place, how it analyzed and 
subsequently understood the problem, what the department and its 
partners did about the problem, and what happened as a result,” he 
writes. “The more vigilant the department becomes in spotting 
emerging problems early, the less available significant crime 
reductions will be. Aggregate levels of crime may remain low but 
relatively steady, even as the department works hard to spot new 
threats before they have a chance to grow out of control.”  
3. “Coercion costs,” including all uses of force and all types of 
detention: Mark Harrison Moore, a leading scholar of police 
performance measurement, has written that “[i]f we reduced crime, 
but did so by relying on more intrusive investigative techniques, or 
patrol techniques that were both more assertive and viewed as biased, 
then the increased use of authority would have to be viewed as a loss 
to be put against the gain.”114 The intensity of coercion – including, for 
example, the average number of times residents in a given community 
are stopped and searched by police – is a key dimension of cost for 
police to recognize. Optimal policing should see extra stops as a cost 
to those stopped, most of whom have done no wrong – and predictive 
analytics should aim to produce safety while imposing a minimum of 
this and other types of cost. 
Data like this would naturally inform a more balanced approach to 
policing. Just as CompStat’s focus on crime measures leads to a 
policing style that focuses on crime rates, there is also evidence that 
other systems (based on other measures) can foster a different 
mindset.  
For example, scholars who work on Risk Terrain Modeling—which 
can involve steps such as using the map of liquor stores and bars in a 
city to target policing resources there—report that the technique 
changed how they thought about policing. Focusing on the geography 
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of physical factors that increase the risk of crime, they wrote, “can 
ground risk-based policing much more into the contexts in which 
police operate rather than concentrating police on behavior that they 
are trying to control.”115 However, “while crime and officer activity 
(e.g. arrest) data is routinely collected and updated by law 
enforcement, it is currently unclear how often police agencies collect” 
geographic feature data related to risk, “or to what extent risk 
variables are considered at all.”116 RTM’s geographic and risk-focused 
approach, the scholars wrote, “encouraged us to think more about 
using ‘risk clusters’ instead of crime hotspots to allocate police 
resources.”117 
In some jurisdictions, the inherent risks of having the police 
gather data about themselves has led government to establish separate 
agencies to collect and analyze crime-related data, outside of police 
departments.118 
 3. Measure and Understand the True Causes of Failure to Appear 
In the case of pretrial risk assessments, which predict re-arrest 
and failure to appear, the tools may come across as if they tell the 
judge who can safely be released, and who cannot. And there is a 
flourishing literature about how, within this paradigm of deciding 
whom to release and whom not to release, algorithms can slightly 
outperform judges. But investment in refining our capacity to predict 
outcomes in a broken jail system arguably distracts the public and 
policymakers from some high impact, feasible interventions. It takes 
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place within a framework of conversation where the bail system we 
have — and even contingent details of how that system operates — are 
implicitly treated as immovable givens. 
For example, there is data showing that failures to appear are 
actually easy to change — dramatic improvements are possible even 
from small adjustments in how the system works. In a 2012 study in 
Colorado, just by calling defendants and reminding them about their 
court dates, the failure to appear rate was reduced by a factor of 
three.119 In Nevada, sending postcards also produce a substantial 
reduction in failures to appear.120 A firm called UpTrust now offers 
counties an automated way to send text message reminders of 
upcoming court dates, and claims that its software can dramatically 
reduce failures to appear.121 
In 2009, the Pretrial Justice Institute reported that only 5% of 
pretrial services agencies call people to remind them of court dates.122 
That is a troubling sign, even though 5% of agencies is likely far more 
than 5% of defendants, because the agencies that do have the 
resources to send reminders are probably the larger ones.123 These 
findings suggest that FTA numbers could be dramatically improved by 
making phone calls, sending text messages, or mailing post cards, 
instead of building jail beds. 
But the growth of predictive analytics may serve to obscure the 
potential of these promising steps. Most of today’s pretrial risk 
assessment instruments were trained on populations that did not 
receive the benefit of convenient reminders of their upcoming court 
dates. As a result, the prediction such tools are making is, how likely is 
this person to return to court on schedule without being reminded to 
appear. An actuarial instrument’s rootedness in the past – its 
blindness to the innovative practice of reminding defendants about 
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their court dates – will lead it to make unduly pessimistic predictions, 
because the predictions will not reflect the greater likelihood of 
reappearance with reminders. As a result, even if a jurisdiction does 
implement reminders (and does, thereby, powerfully increase the true 
probability that released defendants will appear on schedule), it may 
continue to blindly predict failure to appear and thus to jail people 
who, thanks to the reminders, could now be released with low risk. In 
a forthcoming article, a colleague and I explore this problem – which 
we term “Zombie predictions” – in the bail context, and suggest 
specific steps that can be taken to address the issue there. 
B. Leverage New Measures to Define Success Carefully 
The outcome variables that analytics predicts are, inevitably, 
yardsticks of management. A police department that tracks week-to-
week changes in calls for service, or a pretrial services agency that 
tracks all kinds of re-arrest as a single aggregate category, will tend to 
understand its performance in terms of causing those numbers to 
change.  
By tracking and analyzing data that does not correspond to what 
matters most, police and other organizations set themselves up to 
chase a flawed vision of success. The better police, courts and other 
organizations can align their quantifiable definition of success with 
the things that matter most, the more likely it becomes that they will 
ultimately achieve those objectives. 
New measures, such as those described in Section A above, will 
make available new definitions of success for community safety, and 
new ways of tracking, and rewarding performance in the criminal 
justice system. 
C. Open Predictive Systems to Scrutiny, and Build Public Expertise 
In any application of predictive analytics, it is essential that the 
builders and financial backers of a proposed system not enjoy a 
monopoly on understanding how the system works or judging its 
performance. This is a basic matter of good practice for any 
organization, in order to avoid a lemons market.  
In the context of government – where the predictive analytics is 
publicly funded and is a component input in the exercise of public 
authority – the need for public understanding is all the more acute. 
Particularly in criminal justice, where a predictive assessment could 
lead directly to a deprivation of liberty, it is critical that predictive 
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analytics not only function well at a technical level, but also earn and 
deserve public confidence.  
Public authorities, particularly at the local level, often lack even 
the expertise to know what questions to ask about a predictive 
analytics system. As a result, there may be a role for standardized, 
mandatory disclosures of key information about predictive analytical 
systems that are meant for public use. Such disclosures might include, 
among other things: 
● A detailed, descriptive inventory of the training data used in 
the predictive system 
● The system’s definition of predictive success (what engineers 
would call its “loss function”) 
● A description of how the system’s performance will be tracked 
over time, and how its predictive model will be kept up to date in the 
future to match changing conditions. 
Those questions are specific to predictive analytical systems. At 
the same time, there are many dimensions of openness that are vital 
for all kinds of software used by government, which have occasioned a 
rich literature on code transparency.124 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article uses criminal justice as its illustrative domain, but the 
challenges described here sweep far more broadly. Whenever 
government grounds its exercise of power in a statistical model, 
similar challenges may arise. Goals may become distorted. The 
patterns that are reflected in the input data will become part of the 
state’s vision of reality. Quantification can all too easily serve as a 
moral anesthetic. Public authority is not always matched by public 
expertise.  
These challenges may arise in parallel across multiple government 
domains – from criminal justice to child protection, education, 
taxation and immigration -- and lessons learned in one domain may 
well prove valuable in another. In future work, I plan to extend and 
deepen the analysis that this essay begins, to describe cross-cutting 
challenges in the government’s use of predictive analytics and to 
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consider opportunities for stronger institutional design to meet those 
challenges. 
